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AN ACE

UP THEIR SLEEVE OR A HOUSE OF

CARDS:

CAN THE EPA's AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RuLE WITHSTAND CHEVRON
DEFERENCE?

By Shannon Zaret*
he U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C. Circuit) is poised to become a prime battleground
in a fight over the scope of the Environmental Protection
Agency 's (EPA) authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
(GHGs) from the power sector under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
The dispute stems from the EPA's recent efforts to replace the
Obama-era Clean Power Plan (CPP) with the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule (ACE Rule). 1 This move was quickly challenged
by a coalition of twenty-nine cities and states as well as several
prominent American health associations. 2 The two rules reflect
very different views in regards to the role the federal government
should play in combatting climate change, yet the core legal
questions they pose are quite similar. To address pending
litigation directed towards the ACE Rule, the D.C. Circuit will
I ikely engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court must examine
whether the regulation of power plants under Section 112 of
the CAA precludes their regulation under Section I \l(d). 3 If
the court answers in the negative, they must then determine if
the CAA sets limits on the EPA's statutory authority to regulate
power plant GHG emissions. This Article will argue that the
EPA's obligation under Section 112 does not displace their
Section 11 l(d) authority and that the newly finalized ACE Rule
represents a much narrower interpretation of Section 11 l ( d) that
is inconsistent with the congressional intent of the CAA.

T

BACKGROUND
Untangling this knot requires a careful study of the
CAA's history and its impact on EPA's regulatory authority
under Section lll(d). As amended in 1990, the CAA included
conflicting language in Section l 11 ( d). 4 Due to an oversight, both
the House and Senate passed versions that ended up in the final
act. 5 The House version of the bill precluded the use of Section
111 (d) to regulate pollutants " emitted from a source category . ..
regulated" by Section 112. 6 The Senate's version , on the other
hand, barred the use of Section l I l(d) to regulate air pollutants
covered under 112.7 fn other words, the Senate version focused
on barring the duplicative regulation of pollutants and did not
preclude the regulation of the same source for different classes
of pollutants. 8 Although the House version was eventually
codified ,9 this discrepancy would spark major contention fifteen
years later after the CPP was finalized on October 23 , 2015 . 10
Jn West Virginia v. EPA opponents of the CPP argued that
the administration impermissibly relied upon the Senate version
of the amended CAA , rather than the codified House version . 11
They contend that the text of Section 111 (d)( l) has only one
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permissible interpretation and must be read as barring the
regulation of any "source" regulated under Section J 12, even if
in regard to an entirely different class of pollutants. 12 To win on
the merits , opponents would have to demonstrate that the text
is unambiguous and that no other reading of Section 111 (d)( I)
could possibly be reasonable. 13 This is unlikely, as the EPA's
authority to regulate GHGs from existing power plants under
11 l(d) rests on extensive judicial precedent and is consistent
with a long history of CAA precedents from both party ' s
administrations . 14 The argument also finds no support in the
CAA's text, structure, or legis lative history. 15

ANALYSIS
To this day, the issue has never been fully litigated. 16 It
is unclear whether it will be raised in the pending ACE Rule
litigation, but the court will likely address the greater ambiguity
of Section 111 ( d) before tackling the current conflict. If it does,
the court should examine the legislative history and statutory
context which suggests that the EPA's authority to regulate
GHGs under Section 111 ( d) does not stand in contention with
their Section 112 authority.
The second critical question is whether the EPA's authority
to regulate power plant GHG emissions stops at the fence line.
The answer is contingent upon the definition of "best system
for emissions reduction" (BSER). 17 Section 111 of the CAA
directs the EPA to establish emission standards for air pollutants
based on what is achievable under EPA's determination of
BSER. 18 The Obama-era CPP interpreted BSER broadly and
encouraged states to go beyond the power-plant fence-line to
reduce GHG emissions. 19 The Trump administration contends
that the CPP exceeded the EPA's CAA authority and that Section
I J l should be interpreted to apply to emissions reductions that
can be achieved only by mandating controls , "applicable," or
capable of being implemented at, the individual power plant. 20
A federal court will often accept an agency 's construction of an
ambiguous statute they administer (i.e ., Chevron deference). 2 1
ff the court determines the statute unambiguously grants EPA
the authority to determine BSER as it did in ACE, then future
administrations will be tied to this narrower interpretation of
Section 11 l(d). Alternatively, if the courts find that the statute
is ambiguous, they must then examine whether the ACE Rule
is a reasonable interpretation or whether, under the standard of
review, is arbitrary and capricious. 22
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The ACE Rule contains inherent flaws , suggesting the EPA
has not identified the BSER for the power sector but rather just
a system of emissions reduction . For example, the EPA excludes
many emissions reducing technologies and restricts the definition
of BSER to on-site, heat-rate efficiency improvements (HRl). 23
This approach paradoxically prevents greater reductions inside
the fence and would actually raise emissions at some plants. 24
Data from the EPA's own Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)
projected that emissions under ACE would increase at eighteenpercent of coal plants. 25
Further, the rule allows states to decide how significantly
to cut emissions, if at all , rather than providing numeric targets
for them .26 This would enable states to set weaker standards
and prevents the EPA from measuring state progress towards an
established goal. Lastly, EPAs RIA indicates that replacing the
CPP with ACE will result in an increase in sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide emissions and an additional 4 70-1,400 premature
death s compared to the CPP base line.27 The RIA also concluded
that the ACE rule would result in billion s of dollars of net

"foregone benefits" and projected that GHG emissions would be
3% higher in 2030 under every scenario analyzed.28
CONCLUSJON

Cumulatively, these issues restrict ACE from achieving
maximum emission reductions both when compared to the
more flexible CPP and even within their rigid in si de the fence
interpretation. This suggests that the EPA has not identified the
BS ER in the power sector and that there is room for the rule to be
substantially broader. Whether the rule is arbitrary is something
that the courts will ultimately resolve. However, courts should
carefully evaluate these inconsistencies to determine whether
ACE really represents the upper level of the EPA's authority
to regulate GHGs or simply the bare minimum . If courts go
with the latter option, they must reconcil e how this could be
a permissible interpretation of " best systems" or a sufficient
regulatory response given that the legislative intent of the CAA
is to achieve targeted air quality standard s to protect publi c
health nationwide.
ta~
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Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 11-1 2 (20 12). The ACE Rule is being proposed under
Section lll(d), which add resses emissions from existing sources. It sets a
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4
C lea n Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
( 1990) [ hereinafter 1990 CAA].
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Id. § I 08(g) at 2465.
id. § 302(a) at 2574.
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108(g).
io West Virginia v. EPA , No. 15-0 13 63, 2019 U.S . App. LEXIS 29593 (D.C.
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